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Abstract  
We use multilateral bargaining experiments to examine how the order of bargaining (simultaneous or 
sequential) and the nature of contracts (contingent or non-contingent) affect the duration of bargaining, 
the efficiency of exchange, and the distribution of the surplus in a laboratory land-assembly game with 
one buyer and two sellers. While theory predicts an earnings advantage for the first seller when contracts 
are sequential and contingent, and for the second seller when contracts are sequential and non-contingent, 
we find that when a seller has an earnings advantage in the laboratory, it is the first seller to bargain in the 
non-contingent contract treatments. This result contradicts conventional wisdom and a common result 
from the land-assembly literature that it is advantageous to be the last seller to bargain, a so-called 
“holdout”. We also find evidence that sequential bargaining leads to more aggressive seller bargaining 
and greater bargaining delay than simultaneous bargaining, ceteris paribus, and that non-contingent 
contracts increase bargaining delay and the likelihood of failed agreements. The majority of sellers 
indicated a preference for being the first seller to bargain in all sequential bargaining treatments. 
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1. Introduction 
Many economic transactions require universal agreement from multiple parties for a transaction 
to occur and the economic benefits of the exchange to be realized. Examples include land assembly and 
other similar problems such as debt and wage renegotiations. Theoretical analysis of these types of 
bargaining games suggests that the bargaining institution matters.  For example, the ordering and nature 
of the contracts between a potential developer and landowners can play an important role in the efficiency 
of the bargaining process and the distribution of the surplus. In this paper we use multilateral bargaining 
experiments to examine how the order of bargaining and the nature of contracts affect the duration of 
bargaining, the efficiency of exchange, and the distribution of the surplus in a laboratory land-assembly 
game. 
The land-assembly problem refers to the difficulty that a potential land developer may face in 
trying to assemble multiple properties with dispersed ownership for a large development project. A 
developer is likely to face both transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs as individual landowners 
delay agreement in order to obtain as much of the economic surplus as possible. Furthermore, transactions 
costs and strategic bargaining costs are both likely to increase with the degree of land fragmentation. The 
land-assembly problem has been linked to inefficient land use and urban sprawl both theoretically (Miceli 
and Sirmans 2007) and experimentally (Cadigan et al. 2009b). 
Developers may seek to reduce potential financial losses from failed exchanges by using 
contingent contracts. Real estate contracts can be quite complex and involve a variety of different 
contingences. Of particular relevance to the land-assembly problem is the potential for developers to 
purchase properties contingent upon acquisition of adjacent parcels necessary to complete the project.
 
Such contingencies can be either direct or indirect. For example, real estate purchase contracts may be 
contingent upon the developer receiving necessary zoning approval from the city, and the city may make   2
zoning approval contingent upon the developer acquiring all necessary parcels for the project. Thus, the 
sales of all parcels are indirectly contingent upon each other. 
The majority of the theoretical work on land assembly and urban renewal problems assume, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that contracts are non-contingent (e.g. Miceli and Sirmans 2007; Miceli and 
Segerson 2007; O’Flaherty 1994; Strange 1995; Eckart 1985). To account for the possibility that a 
developer may purchase some, but not all, of the desired parcels, these studies typically assume further 
that the project is either divisible, or that resale is possible at a known market price, typically resulting in 
a loss to the developer. We adopt the latter assumption in our experimental treatments with non-
contingent contracts. Furthermore, the previous theoretical work typically abstracts from the actual 
bargaining process by assuming either exogenous exchange prices (e.g. Menezes and Pitchford 2004a, 
2004b) or a bargaining process that results in predictable exchange prices (Miceli and Sirmans 2007; 
Miceli and Segerson 2007). 
While this body of theoretical work is important for gaining insight into potential problems 
associated with land development and urban renewal, little empirical evidence exists to support the 
models’ predictions. We are particularly interested in characterizing bargaining behavior, and examining 
the extent to which behavior changes when the bargaining institution changes. To this end, we use 
laboratory multilateral bargaining experiments with treatments that include both simultaneous and 
sequential bargaining as well as both contingent and non-contingent contracts. Use of the laboratory 
allows us to observe and control buyers’ values and sellers’ costs, something that is generally not possible 
in the field. We compare actual bargaining behavior to a set of equilibrium predictions based on payoff-
maximizing subjects and complete information. While theory predicts an earnings advantage for the first 
seller to bargain when contracts are sequential and contingent, and for the second seller when contracts 
are sequential and non-contingent, we find that when a seller has a statistically significant earnings 
advantage in the laboratory, it is the first seller to bargain in the non-contingent contract treatments. This   3
earnings advantage appears in both single-period and multi-period sequential bargaining treatments with 
non-contingent contracts. This outcome contradicts conventional wisdom and a common result from the 
land-assembly literature that it is advantageous to be the last seller to bargain (i.e. a “holdout”). We also 
find evidence that sequential bargaining leads to more aggressive seller bargaining and greater bargaining 
delay than simultaneous bargaining, ceteris paribus, and that non-contingent contracts increase bargaining 
delay and the likelihood of failed agreements compared to contingent contracts. The majority of sellers 
indicated a preference for being the first seller to bargain in all sequential bargaining treatments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some background on land 
assembly and two potential sources of inefficiency – the holdout problem and the holdup problem. 
Section 3 gives the modeling framework that serves as the basis for the laboratory experiments.  Section 4 
discusses the experimental design and our predictions. Experimental results are given in section 5 
followed by concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
2. Background 
Although the nature and order of contracts are relevant for other bargaining problems, the most 
direct application is to land development, which often requires purchasing multiple, adjacent, 
independently-owned properties. The land-assembly problem is particularly acute for large projects that 
are indivisible, for all practical purposes. If contingent contracts are used, the exchange requires 
agreement by all sellers before anyone receives payment. The developer will not be willing to pay more 
jointly for the properties than the expected development value of the assembled land. However, any seller 
can realize his unit is essential for the completion of the project and strategically delay the exchange in 
order to draw the greatest share of the total surplus. Collectively, land owners may demand more than the 
developer is willing or able to pay, thus threatening the exchange. This problem has been described both 
as a monopoly problem, whereby each seller has monopoly power over his parcel and can demand a price   4
above marginal cost, and as an externality problem, whereby each seller ignores the impact of his demand 
on the other participants to the exchange (Miceli and Sirmans 2007). This can result in inefficiencies 
arising from delay costs or failed exchanges. 
Alternatively, with non-contingent contracts, the developer is faced with the prospect of 
purchasing some properties that can be resold only at a loss if the remaining properties necessary for 
completion of the project cannot be acquired. Once assembly has begun, remaining sellers can exploit this 
initial investment by the developer. In this case, a developer may ultimately find it “optimal” to pay more 
jointly for the properties than the developed value of the assembled land. Predicting this ex post 
exploitation problem, developers may ex ante be unwilling to pay anything above market value for initial 
properties or may hesitate in engaging in sequential land assembly of this kind altogether, again resulting 
in inefficiently low levels of land development. 
The term “holdout problem” has been used variously to describe both the monopoly / externality 
problem associated with contingent contracts and the sequential purchase problem associated with non-
contingent contracts. However, the latter problem is related directly to, and may be more appropriately 
referred to as, a “holdup problem” (Dawid and MacLeod 2008; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004a, 2004b; 
Ellingsen and Robles 2002; Klein, et al. 1978; Williamson 1975), which refers to the general case when 
an upstream agent must make a costly investment in the first stage of a game that is only of use to a single 
downstream agent in the second stage. In such cases, a first-period investment can be held up in a second 
period by the downstream agent in an attempt to extract a greater share of the total surplus generated by 
the investment. The ex post commitment problem inherent in the holdup problem can lead to inefficiently 
low investment in the first stage of the game. This is exactly the nature of the predicted pattern of 
behavior in the land-assembly game with non-contingent contracts. Specifically, land owners in the non-
contingent contract game may have an incentive to “holdout” in order to become the last remaining seller 
who can then “holdup” or exploit the buyer’s initial purchases. In contrast, any seller in the contingent   5
contract game can “holdout” in general, if holdout is interpreted to mean demanding a price above cost, 
thus increasing the likelihood of failed exchanges if all sellers act in a similar fashion. However, sellers 
cannot exploit any initial purchases made by the developer, and the developer can never find it optimal to 
pay jointly more than the assembled value of the land, so a “holdup” problem does not exist. In fact, it is 
possible that holding out in the contingent contract game can be counter-productive, as earlier sellers may 
demand (and receive) the majority of the surplus (because the buyer faces less risk in offering more), 
leaving little of the surplus available for the final seller to split with the buyer. Indeed, we demonstrate 
theoretically that sellers in the sequential contingent contract game have an incentive to bargain early. 
It is important to investigate whether bargaining behavior is consistent with the theoretical 
literature on the holdout and holdup problems. Cadigan et al. (2009a, 2009b) use multilateral bargaining 
experiments to investigate the holdout problem, where holdout is measured as bargaining delay. Cadigan 
et al. (2009a) vary the type of institution (buyer offer versus seller demand), number of bargaining periods 
(one versus ten periods), and examine both costly and costless delay. All of their treatments involved two 
sellers and contingent contracts. They find evidence of a holdout problem, which is less significant in the 
presence of delay costs, and that holdout is payoff improving even in the presence of delay costs. They 
find that when parties can bargain over multiple periods the starting offer to buy is lower and the starting 
demand to sell is higher than in one-period treatments, but overall efficiency improves. They find that the 
bargaining institution (which side is making the offers) affects the distribution of the surplus, but has 
relatively little impact on efficiency. Delay costs reduce holdout, but also result in efficiency losses. 
Cadigan et al. (2009b) vary the number of sellers and level of competition among sellers. They 
find that the buyer’s final earnings vary inversely with the number of sellers, ceteris paribus, indicating an 
incentive to purchase consolidated land. Competition between sellers reduces holdout and the buyer’s 
total purchase price. Therefore, developers may have an incentive to choose projects in areas where land 
is more consolidated, even if the potential surplus from such projects is lower than similar projects where   6
land is more fragmented. This may result in inefficient land allocation and a bias in favor of urban sprawl, 
as land tends to be more fragmented in city centers and more consolidated on the outskirts. 
Winn and Parenta (2010) compare seller behavior under simultaneous and sequential bargaining 
in a land-assembly-type experiment where buyers are computerized and the seller’s strategy space is 
limited to two choices that they characterize as hard bargaining and soft bargaining. Hard bargaining 
involves making a higher demand relative to soft bargaining. Universal hard bargaining by all sellers 
leads to a failed exchange with certainty, while universal soft bargaining leads to a successful exchange 
with certainty. A mix of hard and soft bargaining leads to a successful exchange with some probability 
less than one. They use a repeated, one-round bargaining stage game with three sellers. Qualitatively 
similar to our results, Winn and Parenta find evidence of softer bargaining in the simultaneous treatments 
compared to the sequential treatments. 
 Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a) perform a holdup experiment in which a seller may invest a 
portion of his or her show-up fee in the first period, and in the second period the seller and buyer play a 
Nash bargaining game over the revenue created if investment occurred. Bargaining occurs with varying 
levels of communication (none, buyer communication, or seller communication) to examine if investment 
occurs and the share of the revenues received by each player. They find that communication significantly 
increases investment. They find that players are not entirely selfish in bargaining; the most frequent 
outcome was splitting the surplus regardless of which player could communicate. They find, in contrast to 
theoretical predictions, that seller communication does not completely solve the holdup problem. They 
suggest that multiple rounds of communication may help eliminate the holdup problem.   
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004b) examine the impact that promises and threats have on the 
holdup problem again varying communication as in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a). Here, the holdup 
game is similar to a trust game in that the first mover has to forfeit some of his or her show-up fee, which 
is multiplied, and the second mover is able to split the bargaining pie. It differs from a trust game in that   7
the amount forfeited by the first mover is fixed, the multiple is low, and the second stage is an ultimatum 
game rather than a dictator game. It differs from the holdup game in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a) 
in that bargaining is no longer done via Nash - the seller can reject the proposed split.
1 Again, they find 
that communication increases investment and that a large percentage of buyers propose an equal split of 
the surplus. In addition, they find that promises are more credible than threats. When the bargaining 
institution is Nash bargaining, as in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a), there is less investment with 
buyer or seller communication but more investment when communication is not available relative to 
when the bargaining institution is ultimatum bargaining, as in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004b).  
 
3. Theoretical Modeling Framework 
  Following Cadigan et al. (2009a, 2009b), the model providing the motivation for the experimental 
design includes a single risk-neutral agent we call the “buyer.” The buyer is interested in purchasing N 
complementary units of a good, to be used as intermediate inputs in the production of a larger project, 
from N independent, risk-neutral “sellers” with cost ci per unit and each with one unit to sell. If N input 
units are obtained by the buyer, then the project has value V to the buyer. If any input unit is not acquired, 








          ( 1 )  
indicating that there is an economic surplus generated by the project.   
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1 The differences in bargaining games used for splitting the revenues (Nash versus ultimatum bargaining) in 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a) and (2004b) are implemented to test the theoretical predictions found in 
Ellingsen and Robles (2002).   8
where pi is the price paid for unit i, and each seller i receives a payoff (pi – ci ).  
Given this information, the buyer may use two different contracts. A contingent contract specifies 
that no party receives their payoff unless all of the required input units have been acquired by the buyer. 
Conversely, a non-contingent contract does not require all input units to be purchased, and therefore, any 
seller who sells her unit to the buyer receives a payoff (pi – ci ) regardless of whether or not the buyer 
acquires all necessary units. If the buyer fails to acquire all units under non-contingent contracts, then we 
assume the buyer incurs a (negative) payoff for each purchased unit equal to (ci – pi). That is, we assume 
the buyer can resell units for ci. Sellers who do not sell to the buyer under either contract form receive a 
payoff of zero. We suppose that bargaining between the buyer and sellers takes place over multiple 
periods and there are no delay costs. 
 
 4.  The Experiment and Predictions 
Similar to Cadigan et al. (2009a, 2009b), we use multi-period bargaining experiments. All 
treatments are conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). We conducted six treatments in a 3x2 
design. Three treatments are single-period ultimatum bargaining games, and three treatments are (up to) 
ten-period bargaining games. Two treatments are simultaneous, and four treatments are sequential; two of 
the latter treatments have contingent contracts and two treatments have non-contingent contracts.
2 In all 
treatments there is one buyer and two sellers. We allow the sellers to decide if they wish to be the first 
mover or not when bargaining is sequential. If both sellers choose to be the first seller (seller A) or the 
second seller (seller B), roles are randomly determined.
3 The six total treatments are generated by 
conducting the (1) simultaneous contingent contracts, (2) sequential contingent contracts, and (3) 
                                                           
2 At the end of the non-contingent treatments, subjects completed a risk preferences survey (Holt and Laury 2002) 
consisting of a menu of paired lotteries. The purpose of including the paid survey was to reduce the likelihood that 
any subjects left the experiment with a negative payoff due to losses incurred in the first portion of the experiment. 
3 We considered this addition to the game to be interesting and insightful toward revealing seller behavior and 
strategy.  We wanted to see if the sellers, after understanding the game and developing their strategy, felt there was 
any advantage assigned to the position in which they bargain with the buyer.     9
sequential non-contingent contracts institutions with (1) single-period bargaining and (2) multi-period 
bargaining. In all treatments we have sellers make demands and the buyer chooses to accept or reject.
4 In 
the contingent contract treatments, if the buyer rejects a demand in the single-period treatments (or fails to 
accept a demand by the tenth period in the multi-period treatments) then all bargaining parties in that 
group receive a payoff of zero. In the non-contingent contract treatments, if the buyer fails to reach an 
agreement with the first seller (seller A) then all bargaining parties in that group receive a payoff of zero, 
but if the buyer fails to reach an agreement with the second seller (seller B), the first seller (seller A) 
receives a payoff of her accepted demand minus cost, the second seller (seller B) receives a payoff of 
zero, and the buyer receives a payoff of seller A’s cost minus the accepted demand.
5 For all multi-period 
treatments, if a buyer rejects a demand, the seller is able to make a new demand for up to a maximum of 
ten demands. Unlike in the multi-period Gneezy et al. (2003) experiments, proposers in our experiment 
are not constrained to reduce their demands upon a rejection. 
Valuations and costs are common knowledge. The buyer’s valuation is V =$ 90. The sellers’ costs 
are symmetric such that c1 = c2 = $ 30. This results in an economic surplus of $30 that may be divided 
between the three participants. Once a buyer accepts a demand from a seller, that seller makes no 
additional decisions. In the simultaneous treatments, sellers do not observe demands made for other 
sellers’ units, but are informed of the amount of any accepted demand. In the sequential treatments, the 
second seller (seller B) is informed of the accepted demand, if applicable, and the period in which the 
acceptance occurred. Subjects are informed of their experimental earnings plus a $10 show-up fee and 
paid privately, in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Equilibrium predictions 
                                                           
4 We chose to examine behavior when sellers are the proposers rather than when buyers are the proposers because 
the theoretical outcome for buyer offers is invariant to the type of contract. That is, in each case the buyer should 
offer each seller the seller’s cost and, theoretically, no holdout or holdup will occur. 
5 The buyer is able to resell the unit at the seller’s cost, which would result in a non-positive payoff assuming the 
buyer purchases the unit from seller A for a price equal to or in excess of the seller’s cost.   10
Assuming complete information and that each agent seeks to maximize his monetary self-interest, 
the well-known unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the single-period ultimatum game is for the 
proposer to offer the smallest share of the surplus possible, and for the responder to accept it. Let di 
represent a seller’s demand to sell a particular unit. In the multi-seller design used here, this implies: 
Proposition 1: When the sellers simultaneously make ultimatum demands with contingent contracts, 
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Proposition 2: When the sellers sequentially make ultimatum demands with contingent contracts, a 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists. Normalize the ordering of sellers’ demands such that seller 1 
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Proposition 3: When the sellers sequentially make ultimatum demands with non-contingent contracts, a 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists.
7 Normalize the ordering of sellers’ demands such that seller 1 
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Proposition 4: The buyer should accept any set of demands that leaves the buyer with a positive surplus. 
Proposition 1 characterizes a Nash-like bargaining outcome from the perspective of sellers, 
assuming that the buyer would prefer to accept any positive payoff from accepting compared to a zero 
payoff from rejecting. The sellers should jointly demand virtually the entire surplus, leaving the buyer 
with the smallest payoff possible. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that the first seller to make 
demands has a first-mover advantage. Because an agreement must be reached with all sellers, the first 
seller can extract the entire surplus, leaving little or none of the surplus to be divided between the buyer 
                                                           
6 Technically, to ensure acceptance the sellers should leave the buyer with a payoff of ε, which is one cent in the 
experiment. This is true for all of the protocols examined here. 
7 Note that we ignore the Pareto inferior subgame-perfect equilibrium where the buyer rejects any demand from the 
first seller. The last seller is better off in the equilibrium in proposition 3 when the exchange takes place.   11
and remaining sellers. The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that the final seller can exploit the buyer’s 
purchase from the first seller(s). This is consistent with models of endogenous seller ordering (e.g. Miceli 
and Segerson 2006; Menezes and Pitchford 2004) where there is a disincentive to be the first bargainer 
because the payoff to the second bargainer is higher in equilibrium. This implies that any offer greater 
than cost by the first seller(s) should be rejected. If not, ex post the final seller can exploit the buyer’s 
investment in any of the previous sellers’ units; it is a best response for the final seller to demand the 
entire surplus because the buyer has already committed to all previous seller(s) and will have a (negative) 





i i p c
1
) (  if he does not buy from the final seller. The final seller can, therefore, 
demand up to the value of the project, and accepting the seller’s demand will be better for the buyer than 
rejecting it. Proposition 4 follows from the assumption that a positive payoff is preferred to a zero or 
negative payoff. 
Propositions 1 – 4 are unaffected by multi-period bargaining. The buyer cannot increase his 
payoff by rejecting a set of demands that leaves him with a non-negative surplus, because there is nothing 
in the standard game-theoretic predictions of sellers’ behavior to indicate that they, in equilibrium, should 
demand less or offer a greater share of the surplus following a rejected demand. However, as previous 
studies have demonstrated (e.g. Cadigan et al. 2009a, 2009b), the ability to make multiple bargaining 
offers and responses has a significant impact on bargaining behavior and outcomes. Therefore, we 
investigate both single-period ultimatum bargaining as well as multi-period bargaining. 
The wealth of research in single-period, ultimatum-type bargaining games has consistently 
demonstrated that behavior does not conform strictly to the standard predictions based on the simple 
assumption of maximizing one’s monetary self-interest. Here, however, comparison of simultaneous to 
sequential bargaining, contingent to non-contingent contracts, and single-period to multi-period 
bargaining may yield important qualitative insight into bargaining behavior, even if such behavior does   12




5.   Results 
  Subjects for all treatments were undergraduate student volunteers from Gettysburg College. A 
total of 525 subjects participated anonymously via computer with approximately 18 subjects per session, 
5 sessions per treatment, totaling approximately 90 subjects per treatment for all six treatments.  
Table 1 reports the demand and earnings results for the six treatments. The table provides mean 
first-period demands by sellers, mean first-period earnings for buyers and sellers (had buyers accepted all 
sellers’ first-period demands),
9 and mean final earnings for buyers and sellers. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. Table 2 reports the same earnings results from Table 1 as percentages of the available 
surplus.
10  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
Similar to Cadigan et al. (2009a, 2009b), and the ultimatum bargaining literature, behavior is not 
generally consistent with the game-theoretic predictions in the single-period treatments. Specifically, 
when making demands simultaneously, sellers do not, in general, jointly demand the entire surplus as 
predicted.
 11 The average demand in the single-period simultaneous bargaining treatment is $41.66 (or 
38.9% of the surplus) leaving the buyer with $6.68 (or 22.3% of the surplus). However, seller A’s mean 
                                                           
8 For example, preferences for fairness and aversion to inequity (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000)) may also be important determinants of actual bargaining outcomes. 
9 In the sequential games, this is calculated using both seller A’s and seller B’s first-period demands when seller B 
had an opportunity to make a demand. 
10 Both Table 1 and Table 2 also present demands, final earnings, and percent of the surplus for “seller A” and 
“seller B” in the multi-period simultaneous contingent contract treatment. Here, we define “seller A” as the seller 
whose offer was first accepted, or accepted simultaneously with the other seller’s. 
11 Twice, sellers’ joint demand in the single-period simultaneous treatment left the buyer with negative surplus (-$7 
and -$9.99). The buyer rejected both demands in both cases. Four times, sellers’ joint demand left the buyer with $0 
or $0.01 (all demands were $44.99 or $45 in these cases). The buyer accepted both demands on two occasions, and 
rejected one of the demands on two occasions. The remaining set of demands left the buyer with a positive surplus 
of between $3 and $19. On two occasions the buyer rejected one of the demands. In both rejection cases, the set of 
demands was $45 and $40.   13
demand in the single-period sequential, contingent contract treatment ($43.64, or 45.5% of the surplus) is 
higher than the mean demand in the simultaneous treatment.
12 This is qualitatively consistent with the 
prediction that seller A should demand more in sequential bargaining with contingent contracts.
13 
However, seller A’s mean demand in the single-period sequential, non-contingent contract treatment 
($44.11, or 47% of the surplus) is even higher, contrary to the equilibrium prediction.
14 
The pattern of demands in the single-period treatments is similar to first-period demands in the 
multi-period treatments, except that the initial demands in the latter are much more aggressive. That is, 
the mean first-period seller demand in the multi-period simultaneous demand treatment was $46.73 (or 
55.8% of the surplus), which was actually jointly more than the available surplus. Seller A demanded 
more in the first-period when demands were sequential and contingent ($48.75, or 62.5%), qualitatively 
consistent with equilibrium predictions. Again, however, seller A demanded even more ($52.48, or nearly 
75% of the surplus) when contracts were non-contingent, which is inconsistent with the equilibrium 
prediction. 
Demands from the single-period simultaneous treatment were, on average, $5.07 lower than in the 
multi-period simultaneous treatment, and the difference is statistically significant.
15 For sequential 
contingent contracts, demands from the single-period treatment were, on average, $5.11 ($5.71) lower for 
                                                           
12 Comparing demands in the single-period simultaneous and single-period sequential, contingent contract 
treatments, Mann-Whitney test, one-tailed significance level = 0.13. 
13 The buyer accepted a positive demand of the surplus from seller B on 28 of the 30 occasions in the sequential, 
contingent contract treatment (rejected demands were $50 and $48). Seller B only once made a demand that left the 
buyer with a negative surplus (seller A demanded $44.75, seller B demanded $60). The buyer rejected seller B’s 
demand. Five times seller B’s demand left the buyer with $0 or $1. The buyer rejected three and accepted one of 
these demands (earning $0). The remaining seller B demands left the buyer with a positive surplus of between $2 
and $17.50. The buyer rejected one of these demands (a $45 demand by seller B that followed a $40 demand by 
seller A). 
14 The buyer accepted 21 positive demands of the surplus by seller A and rejected 8 in the sequential, non-contingent 
contract treatment. In only one case did seller B’s demand leave the buyer with a negative payoff (seller A 
demanded $41.99, seller B demanded $55). The buyer accepted this demand. In four cases, seller B’s demand left 
the buyer with $0 or $0.01. The buyer accepted all of these demands. In the remaining 16 cases, seller B’s demand 
left the buyer with a positive surplus of between $2 and $20. The buyer rejected four of these demands, and earned a 
negative payoff each time. 
15 Using Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed significance level = 0.000. All statistical comparisons across treatments use 
Mann-Whitney Tests.    14
seller A (B) than in the multi-period treatment.
16 For sequential non-contingent contracts, demands from 
the single-period treatment were, on average, $8.37 ($6.77) lower for seller A (B) than in the multi-period 
treatment.
17 Consistent with Cadigan et al. (2009a) these differences illustrate how sellers act 
strategically, taking much more aggressive initial bargaining stances across the board in the multi-period 
treatments compared to the single-period treatments. The consistency in the pattern of demands across 
treatments also suggests that sellers bargain more aggressively when they are the first seller to bargain 
(seller A) in the sequential bargaining treatments compared to the simultaneous bargaining treatments, 
regardless of the type of contract. 
Considering seller behavior over time in the multi-period simultaneous demand treatment, we find 
no evidence of strategic behavior on the part of remaining sellers. That is, when buyers accept only one of 
the two demands, theory predicts the remaining seller should change her demand to capture the remaining 
surplus. This never happened. Buyers accepted demands simultaneously on nine occasions. In the 
remaining twenty cases, the remaining seller could have increased her demand in response to receiving 
information on the other seller’s accepted demand, but did not.
18 
Does seller B behavior in the sequential bargaining treatments match the strategies given in the 
equilibrium predictions? And does the type of contract matter? For the multi-period sequential treatment 
with contingent contracts, five of the 29 seller B’s who made offers chose the equilibrium offer in the first 
period by demanding the remaining surplus. Four sellers made first-period demands that would leave the 
buyer with a negative surplus. None of these 29 seller B’s maintained demands to the final period such 
that the buyer faced a zero or negative surplus by period 10.
19 For the multi-period treatments with non-
contingent contracts, three of the 28 seller B’s who made demands chose to “holdup” the buyer. That is, 
                                                           
16 For seller A, two-tailed significance level = 0.024; for seller B, two-tailed significance level = 0.000. 
17 For seller A, two-tailed significance level = 0.000; for seller B, two-tailed significance level = 0.000. 
18 In almost every case in the multi-period treatments, a seller’s demand is the highest in period one, and falling at 
rates that varied by individual seller. In a very few cases, a seller’s demand path had a small “bubble” in the middle 
bargaining periods. 
19 The smallest surplus available to the buyer by seller B’s period 10 was $1.50 in this treatment.    15
three sellers made a demand that would leave the buyer with a negative surplus. Eight sellers made 
demands that would leave the buyer with a zero or $0.01 surplus.
20 The buyer faced a negative surplus by 
period 10 for seller B on only two occasions. While both seller A’s and seller B’s appear to have 
bargained more aggressively in the non-contingent contract treatment, there is little concrete evidence that 
seller B’s were able to recognize the “holdup” problem inherent in non-contingent contracts, or at least 
few seller B’s were willing and able to fully exploit the opportunity in the end. 
How did buyers respond to these demands? And what were the implications of these demands for 
bargaining delay, efficiency, and the final distribution of the surplus? Table 3 reports the percent of first-
period rejections, the average agreement period,
21 the number of failed agreements, and efficiency 
(defined as the percentage of the potential economic surplus actually realized) for each treatment. With no 
delay costs in our treatments, efficiency is equal to the proportion of complete agreements.   
     [Insert  Table  3  here] 
  Table 4 displays the results of binary logit regression on the buyers’ responses for all multi-period 
treatments, and separate regressions for the three different institutions (simultaneous, sequential 
contingent, and sequential non-contingent) where the response variable is defined as accept = 1. The 
pooled regression includes dummy variables for the sequential treatments (the default being the 
simultaneous treatment) as well as dummy variables for seller A in both the simultaneous and sequential 
treatments.
22 The other independent variables are the demand and the bargaining period. The table reports 
marginal effects. 
     [Insert  Table  4  here] 
                                                           
20 In only one of these three cases would accepting the demand have yielded a higher payoff to the buyer than 
rejecting. 
21 For the purpose of comparing average agreement periods, failed agreements are included as period 11 in the 
calculations. This avoids selection bias that would occur if failed agreement observations were dropped from the 
calculations. 
22 For the simultaneous treatment, seller A is defined as any seller who, at the time the demand was made, did not 
have information on the other seller’s accepted demand. Seller B, therefore, is any seller who knew the other seller’s 
accepted demand, and was the only remaining seller making a demand in that period.   16
Table 5 displays the results of a binary logit regression of the buyers’ first-period responses 
across all six treatments (again where the response variable is accept = 1) and separately for the three 
single-period treatments.  The independent variables are demand, seller A, the type of contract 
(contingent vs. non-contingent), and single period.  Again, the defaults are seller B, the simultaneous 
bargaining treatment, and multi-periods. The table reports marginal effects. 
     [Insert  Table  5  here] 
A set of demands that would yield a negative payoff occurred twice in the single-period 
simultaneous treatment,
23 once in the single-period treatment when contracts were contingent,
24 and once 
when contracts were non-contingent.
25 The vast majority of rejections in each of these single-period 
treatments were, therefore, positive surplus rejections. 
However, in the first period of the multi-period treatments, buyers faced aggressive bargaining 
demands by sellers, with first-period demands resulting in a negative payoff to the buyer, in many cases, 
had they accepted all first-period demands. Consequently, 91.7%, 96% and 100% of first-period demands 
were rejected in the simultaneous, contingent, and non-contingent multi-period treatments, respectively. 
The regression results in Table 4 indicate that buyers were more likely to accept a demand the lower the 
demand, the later the period in which the demand occurred, and if the demand came from seller A, 
particularly in the non-contingent contract treatment. Buyers were less likely to accept a given demand, in 
general, in the sequential bargaining treatments compared to the simultaneous treatment, and if contracts 
were non-contingent. Table 5 further illustrates that buyers were much more likely to accept a given first-
period demand, ceteris paribus, if it was a single-period ultimatum demand. This indicates that buyers 
also act strategically by rejecting nearly all early demands in the multi-period treatments. 
                                                           
23 Joint demands of $99.99, and $97.00 were rejected. 
24 Seller A demanded $44.75 and seller B demanded $60. The buyer rejected seller B’s demand. On two other 
occasions, the joint demand was $90 exactly, and the buyer rejected seller B’s demand both times. 
25 Seller A demanded $41.99 and seller B demanded $55. The buyer accepted seller B’s demand. On three other 
occasions, the joint demand was $90 exactly, and the buyer accepted seller B’s demand each time.   17
Interestingly, although sellers act much more aggressively in the early periods of the multi-period 
treatments, they do soften their demands over time. Figures 1 and 2 give the average demand by period 
for each of the treatments. The figures show that while initial demands are higher in the multi-period 
treatments, they tend to fall to the level of average single-period demands by the final periods. Also 
noteworthy from the two figures is that the average demands of both seller A’s and seller B’s are higher 
in all periods of the sequential bargaining treatments compared to the simultaneous bargaining treatment. 
Figures 1 and 2 do not accurately illustrate how much demands were actually changing, because the 
lowest demands were being accepted by the buyers. For example, Figures 3 and 4 show the average 
cumulative change in sellers’ demands over time, respectively. Therefore, it appears that sellers viewed 
rejections by the buyers as credible commitments to reject a given demand, and they subsequently 
reduced their demands considerably.  
The results in Tables 1 – 5 also yield some clear patterns with regard to the distribution of the 
surplus, the amount of bargaining delay, and the efficiency of exchange across treatments. In both the 
single-period and multi-period treatments, the buyer’s mean final earnings are highest in the simultaneous 
bargaining treatment and lowest in the sequential, non-contingent contract treatment.
26 The reverse is true 
for seller A’s mean final earnings, though seller B’s final earnings do not follow the same pattern.
27 Thus, 
both the buyer’s payoff and seller B’s payoff appear to be inversely related to seller A’s payoff, which 
makes intuitive sense as the three subjects are ultimately splitting a fixed $30 surplus. However, it is clear 
that the availability of multiple bargaining periods leads to a Pareto improvement – the mean final 
earnings of the buyer and both sellers are higher across the board in the multi-period treatments relative to 
the single-period treatments. This is consistent with the higher rates of agreement and efficiency in the 
multi-period treatments. Efficiency rates from Table 3 were 76.9%, 76.7% and 58.6% for the single-
                                                           
26 Five buyers (17%) in the multi-period non-contingent contract treatment ended with negative earnings. 
27 Seller A has highest mean final earnings in the sequential non-contingent contract treatments, while seller B has 
the lowest final earnings in this treatment.   18
period simultaneous, sequential / contingent, and sequential / non-contingent contract treatments, 
respectively, and 96.7%, 90.0%, and 76.7% for the corresponding multi-period treatments. Although all 
parties took a more aggressive bargaining stance in the early periods of the multi-period treatments, 
agreements were reached more often, and all parties benefitted. 
Comparing efficiency rates across treatments, again efficiency was highest in the simultaneous 
treatments both for single-period and multi-period bargaining treatments, and lowest for the sequential, 
non-contingent contract treatments. The lowest efficiency level overall (58.6%) occurred in the single-
period sequential treatment with non-contingent contracts. Interestingly, the efficiency level for the multi-
period sequential, non-contingent contract treatment (76.7%) was about equal to the best of the single-
period bargaining treatments. Therefore, it is clear that sequential, non-contingent contracts yield the 
greatest number of failed agreements and the lowest efficiency of the three bargaining institutions 
investigated here. Although bargaining delay is costless in our treatments, there is also evidence that it 
took longer for agreements to be reached, on average, in the sequential, non-contingent contract 
treatments. The average agreement period was 8.33 in this treatment compared to 7.16 and 6.5 for the 
sequential, contingent and simultaneous bargaining treatments, respectively. Furthermore, the greater 
delay appears to apply to bargaining with both seller A and seller B, as the average agreement period with 
seller A was 7.47, and 9.25 with seller B. Both seller types took the most aggressive bargaining stances in 
this treatment, and the buyers exhibited a greater reluctance to accept a given offer when contracts were 
non-contingent. These two factors combined explain both the greater bargaining delay in the multi-period 
treatment and lower efficiency rates in both the single-period and multi-period non-contingent contract 
treatments. 
Finally, is there an advantage to being either seller A or seller B in any of the treatments? And do 
sellers correctly anticipate such an advantage, when one exists? In each of the sequential bargaining   19
treatments, between 77% and 86% of sellers indicated a preference for being seller A.
28 This preference 
shows that the majority expected a potential earnings advantage for the first seller to bargain. In the 
single-period sequential bargaining treatments, seller A had an earnings advantage in both treatments, 
despite the prediction that seller A should earn more when contracts are contingent, and seller B should 
earn more when contracts are non-contingent.
29 In the multi-period sequential bargaining treatments, 
seller A had an earnings advantage only in the non-contingent contract treatment ($11.00 compared to 
$7.84), despite the prediction that seller B should earn more when contracts are non-contingent.
30 
However, seller B earned more, on average, than seller A in the contingent contract treatment ($9.33 
compared to $10.80), though the difference is not statistically significant at standard levels.
31 
In the multi-period simultaneous bargaining treatment, when agreements were reached with 
sellers in different periods, we identify “seller A” as the first seller to reach an agreement with the buyer 
(or when demands were accepted simultaneously), and “seller B” as the last seller. There is some 
evidence that it was advantageous for sellers to bargain more aggressively. Those sellers that reached 
agreements later had higher mean final earnings ($8.79 for seller A compared to $10.20 for seller B), and 
the difference in final earnings is statistically significant.
32 From Table 3, the average agreement period 
for “seller A’s” in the multi-period simultaneous treatment was 5.67, compared to period 8 for “seller 
B’s”. Therefore, as in Cadigan et al. (2009a, 2009b), we again have some evidence that aggressive 
bargaining and “holding out” is payoff improving, though our treatment involved sellers making demands 
on the buyer, and delay was costless. 
                                                           
28 The proportion of sellers choosing to be seller A is not significantly different across the sequential treatments. 
Using a two-tailed proportions test comparing the contingent contract treatments to the non-contingent contract 
treatments the percentages of sellers choosing to be seller A are not different; single-period p = 0.540 and multi-
period p = 0.539. 
29 The statistical significance of the differences is greatest in the single-period sequential bargaining treatment with 
non-contingent contracts (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, two-tailed p = 0.162). 
30 The difference in final earnings is statistically significant; using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, two-tailed p = 
0.021. 
31 Using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, two-tailed p = 0.438. 
32 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, two-tailed p = 0.011.   20
 
6.   Conclusions 
  The nature of bargaining and the type of contract used can have potentially important 
implications for the distribution of the economic surplus, the duration of bargaining, and the overall 
efficiency of exchange, particularly in bargaining scenarios, such as land assembly, in which unanimous 
consent is required. While it is difficult to reproduce all salient features of real-world bargaining in the 
laboratory, analysis of behavior in experimental bargaining games may yield insights into how people 
bargain in the field, and how behavior and outcomes may be affected by changes in the bargaining 
institution or environment. In this paper, we reported the results of laboratory multilateral bargaining 
experiments designed to examine how the order of bargaining (simultaneous or sequential) and the nature 
of contracts (contingent or non-contingent) affect behavior and outcomes in a land-assembly game with 
one buyer and two sellers. 
While theory predicts an earnings advantage for the first seller when bargaining is sequential and 
contracts are contingent, and for the second seller when contracts are non-contingent, we find that when a 
seller has a statistically significant earnings advantage in the laboratory when bargaining is sequential, it 
is the first seller to bargain under non-contingent contracts. This result contradicts conventional wisdom 
and a common result from the land-assembly literature that it is advantageous to be the last seller to begin 
to bargain, a so-called “holdout”. We should note, however, that when bargaining simultaneously, those 
sellers that reached agreements with the buyer in later periods did have higher earnings than those who 
reached agreements earlier. Thus, it appears that while there is an advantage to bargaining more 
aggressively, in general, based on our experimental results there is not any clear advantage to being the 
last seller to begin bargaining. This was particularly apparent in the non-contingent contract treatments. 
Although, theoretically, the final seller can exploit the buyer’s initial purchases and extract most of the 
surplus, the results indicate that the final sellers had lower payoffs than the first sellers in such treatments,   21
and the lowest payoffs, in general, across all the treatments. In contrast, the first seller to bargain in these 
treatments took a more aggressive bargaining stance, contrary to theory, and enjoyed higher payoffs. This 
approach, however, contributed to lower agreement rates, and lower payoffs for the buyer and subsequent 
sellers. It is not clear why initial sellers chose to bargain more aggressively rather than less, as theory 
would predict. Perhaps the first sellers to bargain sequentially recognize, in general, that a successful 
agreement with them is critical to the exchange regardless of the type of contract and, therefore, bargain 
more aggressively. And perhaps, under non-contingent contracts, the prospect of a payoff that does not 
depend on the decisions of the remaining bargaining parties heightens the anticipation of a larger payoff 
relative to bargaining under contingent contracts. Additional investigation is required to answer these 
questions. The majority of sellers in all sequential bargaining treatments appear to have anticipated a 
potential earnings advantage for the first seller by indicating a preference for being the first seller to 
bargain. 
We also find evidence that sequential bargaining leads to greater bargaining delay than 
simultaneous bargaining, ceteris paribus, and that non-contingent contracts increase bargaining delay and 
the likelihood of failed agreements. Buyers also had consistently lower average final payoffs when 
bargaining was sequential and contracts were non-contingent. Therefore, from the perspective of a land 
developer it appears advantageous to bargain simultaneously with land owners and use contingent 
exchange contracts, if possible. While the availability of multiple bargaining periods seems to alleviate 
some of the problems associated with sequential and non-contingent contracts, it does not eliminate them.   22
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33 In the multi-period simultaneous bargaining treatment, when agreements were reached with sellers in different 
periods, we identify “seller A” as the first seller to reach an agreement with the buyer (or when demands were 
accepted simultaneously), and “seller B” as the last seller.   25
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34 Here again, “seller A” is defined as any seller whose demand was accepted prior to or simultaneously with the 
other seller’s demand. “Seller B” is any seller whose demand was accepted after the other seller’s, or not accepted at 
all.   27
Table 4. Logit regression results (marginal effects calculated) for buyers’ responses across time for the 
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__ __ __ 
N= 1295  388  431  476 
Pseudo R
2 =  0.26 0.28 0.28 0.29 
    
*** Significant at the 1% level   28
Table 5. Logit regression results (marginal effects calculated) for buyers’ first-period responses 
(accept=1), standard errors in parentheses 
 







Seller A_SIM  0.351 
(0.220) 
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N= 337  160 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.619  0.071 
      
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level   29
Figure 1. Seller A average demand by period in multi-period treatments
35 
 
Figure 2. Seller B average demand by period in multi-period treatments
36 
 
                                                           
35 Average demands of all sellers shown for the simultaneous bargaining treatment. 
36 Average demands of all sellers shown for the simultaneous bargaining treatment.   30









                                                           
37 Average demands of all sellers shown for the simultaneous bargaining treatment. 
38 Average demands of all sellers shown for the simultaneous bargaining treatment. 